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In 1937, a comment in the Yale Law Journal, prompted by episodes at two
leading universities, surveyed the American case law and concluded as follows:1
It is extremely difficult to frame a legal action through which the courts can give relief
against such unwarrantable limitations on academic freedom. Academic freedom is not a
"property" right, or a constitutional privilege, or even a legal term defined by a history
of judicial usage and separately listed in the digests and Words and Phrases. Moreover,
where a case is brought presenting the consequences of an interference with academic freedom in justiciable form, and petitioning for an accepted mode of legal relief, the plaintiff
faces the added barrier of a profession of judicial reluctance to intervene in the internal
affairs of an educational institution, an attitude which is said to limit the court to an
examination of the authority, not the propriety, of administrative action.
A quarter of a century later, when Professor David Fellman surveyed the legal
situation, he found it essentially unchanged:
While there has been no dearth of litigation in the state appellate courts on subjects involving teachers and education, a reading of hundreds of cases has yielded very few
opinions which pay any attention to the subject of academic freedom, and, much less,
show any genuine appreciation of either its meaning or importance2 ....
So far as academic freedom and tenure in colleges and universities are concerned, American decisional law may be described as formless and almost rudimentary. While there
has been some discussion of the concept of tenure in higher education, very little understanding of its meaning and significance will be found in the reported cases, and if professors enjoy some security of tenure, they have it for nonlegal reasons largely. As for
academic freedom, one must look very hard indeed to find a judicial opinion in which the
phrase is even used, and genuine appreciation of its great values in the life of the nation
While the case for
is almost nonexistent in the published views of appellate judges3 ....
academic freedom is a powerful one, and while it is accepted in some important circles of
American life, it cannot be said that the judges have even begun to demonstrate any serious
appreciation of what it is all about.4
* B.A. 1941, Southwestern University (Memphis, Tenn.); LL.B. 1948, University of Virginia; J.S.D.
196o, Yale University. Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
'Comment, Academic Freedom and the Law, 46 YAL L.J. 670, 67x (i937).
By this time academic
2 Fellman, Academic Freedom in American Law, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 3, 17.
freedom had finally made its way into Words and Phrases. The pocket part to volume i carries the title
and the following definition: "'Academic freedom' is the freedom to do good and not to teach evil." This
profound utterance is from Kay v. Board of Higher Education of the City of New York, i73 Misc. 943,
951, z8 N.Y.S.2d 821, 829 (Sup. Ct. 1940), in which the court barred the appointment of Bertrand
Russell to a chair of philosophy at City College of New York.
Fellman, supra note 2, at 35.
F
Id. at 46.
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The reasons for this state of affairs are doubtless multiple and not always clear.
Certainly they go beyond the reasons given by the judges in their decisions. Without
seeking to exhaust the possibilities, it is suggested that the following have been
important factors. First, the academic world has not sufficiently educated the rest
of the populace as to the purpose, need, and importance of academic freedom.
Indeed, one of the most discouraging aspects of the situation is how many members
of the teaching fraternity there are who show little comprehension of or sympathy
for the cause, and who, so long as they are not personally affected, will watch with
apparent unconcern while one of their colleagues is victimized.5 It is not surprising
that a freedom which is valued so little by so many of its beneficiaries is accorded
little respect by others. Judges, of course, share to a large extent the attitudes and
opinions of the time and the community in which they serve. We teachers may as
well admit that academic freedom is not a value for which the public at large has
any great enthusiasm. Educators are aware, of course, that academic freedom rests
upon the broad social and public ground that unless teachers are free to think and
study and teach and write, the high purposes of education to serve and advance the
welfare of society will be frustrated. Too often, however, the claim of academic
freedom is put forth in a guise which makes it appear to be a bid for special privilege.
This gives it little appeal either to the public or to the courts. It is important that
both should realize that social progress, and not simply individual right, is the basic
and ultimate justification for academic freedom.
A second reason, I think, is one which is common to most of the great human
freedoms. That is that they are almost invariably invoked by or in behalf of some
persona or causa non grata. The test case frequently centers on an individual who
personally or because of his conduct is considered unattractive or undesirable in some
way by the community in which he asserts the right. This is one reason why there
is such resistance to a generous interpretation of those provisions of the Bill of Rights
which are applicable to criminal defendants. It is why the privilege against selfincrimination arouses such an adverse reaction when used by one who is thought
to be a communist. It is why the Negro's claim to freedom from discrimination is
resisted so bitterly in the Deep South. The claim of academic freedom, likewise, is,
apt to be advanced in support of a teacher whose activities run strongly counter to.
community mores and attitudes. It may be a teacher who advocates desegregation in
Alabama, or who opposes in Massachusetts the nation's policy toward Cuba, or who,
condones pre-marital sex relations in Illinois. It is when the exercise of a freedom.
is unpopular or controversial that the propensity to deny it is most strongly aroused..
' "The average professor in an American college will look on at an act of injustice done to a brother
professor by their college president with the same unconcern as the rabbit who is not attacked watches theferret pursue his brother up and down through the warren to predestinate and horrible death. We know,
of course, that it would cost the non-attacked rabbit his place to express sympathy for the martyr; and thenon-attacked is poor, and has offspring, and hope for advancement. The non-attacked rabbit would,
of course, become a suspect, and a marked man the moment he lifted up his voice in defense of rabbitrights." John Jay Chapman, quoted in Russmu. Kisuc, AcADaac FRa mom 98 (x955).

AN EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

It should be dear that unless the freedom is protected in such cases it may as well not,
indeed, does not exist. Someone has put the thought in the pungent observation
that unless we protect the rights of the so-and-so's, the rights of all of us will be in
danger. And yet it takes a considerable degree of detachment and mental selfdiscipline to defend a freedom on behalf of an individual or a cause which is thought
to be hostile or dangerous. As Mr. Robert Hutchins has said, "Academic freedom
is, I think, generally regarded as a device by which weak-minded or vicious people
in some way hang on to their jobs when all right-thinking men would agree that
they ought to lose them."6
A third reason why the courts have not accorded more respect to the claims of
academic freedom is, I believe, the failure of the academic community to vigorously
and collectively press these claims before the courts. Many educators have discounted
the law as a source of protection for academic freedom. 7 This may be the result,
rather than the cause, of the numerous instances in which teachers have gone to
court and lost. Such efforts have been ad hoe, episodic, personally financed, and
tried by counsel under whatever legal theory could be dredged up under the circumstances. The academic community in an organized sense has given little
support to these legal actions. Compare the way in which Negroes have won judicial
recognition and protection of their right to be free from discrimination through
careful formulation of legal arguments and the bringing of test cases under the
auspices and financial support of a national organization. I will concede at once
that there are substantial and obvious differences between the two situations. It is
true that the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) has intervened
as a friend of the court in a few selected cases, but its energies are expended almost
entirely in non-legal directions. This is not said by way of criticism; there are
doubtless sound reasons why this is so. ,Indeed, many educators believe very
strongly that the cause of academic freedom will be better off by relying on self-help
methods within the academic world rather than by turning to the law and the
courts. This may be the better wisdom. All I am suggesting is that, when the
organized academic community, for whatever reason, has not pressed the claims of
academic freedom in the courts, it should occasion no great surprise that the courts
have by and large not recognized such claims.
It is the primary purpose of this article to suggest that a series of recent decisions
by the United States Supreme Court has opened up the possibility of a substantial
degree of judicial protection of academic freedom as a right recognized and guaranteed by the United States Constitution. To the extent that academic freedom may
be a matter of constitutional right, it should serve effectively to remove the two
obstacles to judicial protection noted at the outset, namely, the difficulty in framing
'RoBERT

M.

HUTCMNs, THE UNIVERSITY OF UTOPIA 78 (1953).

" See, e.g., ROBERT M. MAclvEr, AcADEime FREEDOM IN Ott Tist 237 (1955): "When we speak
here of the scholar's rights we do not refer to legally established guarantees, for the law provides few of
the particular safeguards he needs, and in the nature of the case it must probably remain so." And see
note X2 infra.
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a legal cause of action and the reluctance of courts to intervene in the internal affairs
of an educational institution. A claim of denial of a recognized right under the
United States Constitution is, of course, a good cause of action not only in the federal
but also in the state courts, always assuming that the facts are sufficient to support
the claim.8 As to the second point, it is not lightly to be assumed that anyone, including the governing board of a college or a university, can be vested with nonreviewable discretion to interfere with a right guaranteed by the Constitution.
It must be borne in mind, however, that any protection of academic freedom
which may flow from the provisions of the Constitution would be confined to public
institutions.

Constitutional limitations run against action by government, not

against private individuals or associations. The "state action" concept would
obviously include action by the governing boards of state colleges and universities
and would just as clearly seem to exclude action by privately endowed institutions of

learning. Of course, if the act of the private institution was required by the state
then the Constitution would be applicable. As it happens, however, it is by action

of the governing boards in the state colleges and universities that academic freedom
is most frequently violated. This phenomenon was observed as early as the turn
of this century,' and has also been found by very recent studies to be the case today1
The fact is further substantiated by the experience of the AAUP. Of the fifty-one
institutions censured between 1931 and 1962, thirty-one were public. It follows,
therefore, that although the constitutional protection of academic freedom would be
limited in its scope to public institutions, such confinement happens to coincide with
the area where the need for the protection is greatest. If, as many educators believe,
'Jurisdiction is not discussed in this article. The relevant statutory provisions, so far as the United
States district courts are concerned, would appear to be 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3) (9.58), and 42
U.S.C. § x983 (1958). In certain instances, resort to state courts may be preferable. See Racial Integration
and Academic Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 725, 899 (959) (part i of a study by the Arthur Garfield
Hays Memorial Fund, New York University, School of Law).
' ". . .the tendency to jeopardize the freedom of the teacher is probably more conspicuous among state
universities than among endowed ones." Hadley, Academic Freedom in Theory and Practice,91 ATLANTIC
MoNrTHLy 152, 334, 344 (1903).
"0"The central fact of the present is that these pressures come primarily from government and bear
more heavily upon institutions dependent upon public support. Even Mr. Harold Laski, who theoretically
would not be expected to make the observation, notes in his American Democracy that such academic
freedom as American colleges and universities possess is more ample in privately endowed and supported
institutions than in public ones. Though there are, of course, many exceptions to this statement, my
experience on the whole reinforces his observation." Kirkland, Academic Freedom and the Community, in
FRE DOM AND THE UNIVERSITr115, 116 (i95o) (Essays presented as lectures in the third part of Cornell
University Symposium on "America's Freedom and Responsibility in the Contemporary Crisis," Spring,
1949).

"Now it has often been remarked . . . that academic freedom commonly is more secure, and the
unflinching pursuit of wisdom is more frequently encountered, at our distinguished private universities
and colleges than at most institutions supported by the state; and I found this to be true. The necessity
of conforming to popular impulses of the hour, as expressed through the executive and legislative
branches of state governments, often severely hampers the independence of the state university or college . . . . I do not mean to say that all state universities and colleges are weakly subservient to the
political administration. . . . Yet, by and large, I am well enough satisfied that the atmosphere is freer,
and the respect for the dignity of the professor greater, at private foundations." RUSSELL KIRK, AcADtmic
FREEDOM

35-36

(1955).
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the future belongs to public education and private education will be more and more
forced to the wall financially, the scope of the protection will increase. In any
event, judicial protection of academic freedom in the public institutions would
almost inevitably have a wholesome effect upon the practice in the private ones.
I
ACADEMIC FREEDOM DEFINED

Before reviewing the court decisions, it seems advisable to ascertain the nature
and definition of the thing we are considering. Probably the best way to do this is to
consult the academic authorities who have reflected deeply and written well on the
subject of academic freedom. The definitions of academic freedom set forth in the
footnote below are offered as the best that I have found in my reading of the
literature."
Although all of these definitions are different in phraseology and although each
has its own variation of emphasis, they are all essentially the same in content. Collectively, they define academic freedom in terms of study, research, opinion, discussion, expression, publication, speech, teaching, writing, and communication.
To one familiar with constitutional law but who had never heard of academic
freedom, these terms would instantly fall within a familiar framework, the great
"' Arthur Lovejoy, one of the founders of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP),
offered the following early definition: "Academic freedom is the freedom of the teacher or research worker
in higher institutions of learning to investigate and discuss the problems of his science and to express his
conclusions, whether through publication or in the instruction of students, without interference from
political or ecclesiastical authority, or from the administrative officials of the institution in which he is
employed, unless his methods are found by qualified bodies of his own profession to be clearly incompetent
or contrary to professional ethics." Lovejoy, Academic Freedom, i ENCYc. Soc. ScL 384 (1930).
Professor Fritz Machlup, currently president of the AAUP, after noting that "it is difficult or impossible to formulate an unambiguous definition of academic freedom," defines the term as follows:
"Academic freedom consists chiefly in the absence of, or protection from, such restraints or pressures
...as are designed to create in the minds of academic scholars (teachers, research workers, and students
in colleges and universities) fears and anxieties that may inhibit them from freely studying and investigating whatever they are interested in, and from freely discussing, teaching, or publishing whatever
opinions they have reached." Machlup, On Some Misconceptions Concerning Academic Freedom, 41
A.A.U.P. BULL. 753 (1955).

Professor Robert MacIver has written that "Academic freedom is a right claimed by the accredited
educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions
without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization because these conclusions are
unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution. Here is the core of the
doctrine of academic freedom. It is the freedom of the student within his field of study." RoaaRT M.
MA IVER, AcAa amc FtaDon s OuR Tima 6 (1955).
Finally, the 1940 Statement of Principles which is accepted generally throughout the educational
world as the most authoritative statement extant, asserts that academic freedom means that "(a) The
teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the adequate
performance of his other academic duties. .. . (b) The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom
in discussing his subject, but he should be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial matter
which has no relation to his subject. . . . (c) The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member
of a learned profession, and an officer in an educational institution. When he speaks or writes as a citizen,
he should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but his special position in the community
"
imposes special obligations ..
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and indispensable freedom which the first amendment protects against abridgment
by Congress, and which is considered so fundamental to a system of liberty and
justice that it is included in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and
thus made a limitation on the powers of the states. Indeed, academic freedom as
so defined seems to fall so naturally and readily and logically within the ambit of
constitutionally protected speech and communication that it would be surprising, in
fact, if academic freedom had not been brought within the scope of the first and
fourteenth amendments."2 It is clear from the jurisprudence of the past twenty-five
"5 But consider the following statement of Professor Russell Kirk, that academic freedom is not to be
found "guaranteed by any article of the federal or state constitutions, or described in any legislative enact" In so far as this statement is descriptive of the state of the law as of the
ment, here in America ..
time it was written, no quarrel can be taken with it, although its validity has been undermined by subsequent Supreme Court decisions, as we shall see presently. Professor Kirk continues: "Nothing in the laws
of our federal system, or of the several states, guarantees the enduring right of a teacher to speak the truth
as he sees it, or to pursue the truth according to the light that is given him. In extreme circumstances, it
is true such a teacher might appeal to the general provisions for freedom of speech found in the federal
Bill of Rights and in the state constitutions; but then he would be appealing not to academic freedom,
but simply to the statutory freedom which is constitutionally guaranteed to all men, whatever their
If a denial of academic freedom
ACADEMIC FrEEDom 5 (1955).
K
occupation or status." RussELL aR,
consists of reprisal for what a teacher has said or written, then the protection of the teacher under
general free speech principles would seem clearly to be a protection of his academic freedom. The fact
that academic freedom is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution would seem to be unimportant.
Constitutionally protected speech can be exercised through a variety of media and in a variety of contexts,
only one of which is the mouth and pen of a professor, and none are mentioned in the Constitution.
Academic freedom is one kind of speech in one context, and because it can be subsumed under a broader
heading it does not thereby lose its identity. Many a discharged professor would not cavil over the point.
Consider also the following statement by Professor Fritz Machlup: "Academic freedom antedates
general freedom of speech by several hundreds of years, and its development was quite separate and
independent. In the United States, academic freedom is not a right that professors or students have under
the Constitution or under any law of the land, whereas general freedom of speech is one of the civil
liberties protected by the Bill of Rights in our Constitution. While violations of this right can be taken
to the courts of law, infringement of academic freedom can be protected only by appealing to the conscience
of individuals and groups in society; there is no recourse to the courts except where contractual relations
are involved. Finally, academic freedom requires special safeguards quite different from those provided
by the freedom of speech guaranteed in the Constitution." Machlup, On Some Misconceptions Concerning
Academic Freedom, 41 A.A.U.P. BULL. 753, 755 (x955). Again, to a large extent the statement is a
descriptive one, subject to being outdated, as it has been, by subsequent judicial declaration. The statement
raises the additional point, however, that historically, academic freedom and free speech generally had
disparate sources of origin and have had separate lines of development. But this would not seem to
preclude their eventual merger. Free speech theory antedated the Constitution, which subsequently incorporated it. Constitutional guarantees have their own evolutionary processes, and they grow by
enveloping action. The history of constitutionally protected speech in this country has been written
largely within the past twenty-five years. A guarantee which extends its mantle over the street corner
orator, the anonymous pamphleteer, and the motion picture might sensibly be thought broad enough to
include the university professor.
A recent history has also distinguished academic freedom and freedom of speech. "The connections
between free speech and academic freedom are many and subtle. One thing is clear as far as their
historical linkages are concerned: the advance of the one has not automatically produced a comparable
advance of the other. We have seen, for example, that academic freedom scored victories in which
freedom of speech did not share . . ..
One may
Conversely, freedom of speech has made gains while academic freedom stood still. . ..
therefore conclude that the two freedoms develop independently for different reasons, or that they are
causally related to a common long-term factor, such as the diffusion of political power or the growth
of the habit of tolerance. Nevertheless, it can also be demonstrated that, under certain favorable conditions, these two freedoms do affect one another directly, and that the secure position of the one may
improve the position of the other and deepen and broaden its meaning and potency." 1cmiAv HosTDrun-a
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years that the Supreme Court is committed, and one may say with some confidence
irrrevocably committed, to a liberal application of these amendments. The dispute
over the proper tests and standards to be applied in speech cases and the disagree-

ment as to result in particular instances sometimes obscure the broad consensus on
the Court that the survival of our democratic society will depend largely upon the

broad scope and exercise of intellectual freedom. Educational freedom is perhaps
the most important aspect of intellectual freedom, and among the educational freedoms none are more important than academic freedom, the freedom of the teacher.
It would be passing strange if the Supreme Court had not come eventually to
recognize within its broad view of intellectual freedom one of the vital components.

II
SUPREME COURT OPINIONS ON

ACADEMIC

FREEDOM

Let us look, therefore, at the opinions through which the Court has recognized
academic freedom as a constitutional right. This can be done conveniently by briefly
noting four of the Court's decisions, all rendered during the I95o's.' 3
In Adler v. Board of Educationy4 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a

section of the New York Civil Service Law, implemented by the so-called "Feinberg
Law." These sections together provided for the disqualification and removal from
the public school system of teachers and other employees who advocated the over-

throw of the government by unlawful means or who belonged to organizations
which had such a purpose.
that,

5

The gist of Justice Minton's majority opinion stated

A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes the attitude of young
minds towards the society in which they live. In this, the state has a vital concern. It
must preserve the integrity of the schools. That the school authorities have the right
& WALTER P. MEVZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEmic

FREEDOM IN TM UMrrE

STATES 403-04

(1955).
See also, for views contrary to the text, York, The Legal Nature of 4cademic Freedom, 48 BRIEF 246
('953), and Cole, Academic Freedom as a Civil Right, 2 WEsTERN POL. Q. 402 (1949).
" In an earlier case, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (923), the Court invalidated a statute which
prohibited the teaching of German in all schools in the state through the eighth grade. Plaintiff taught
German at a private school. The Court said that "His right thus to teach and the right of parents to
engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the [fourteenth] amendment."
Id. at 400.
14 342 U.S. 485 (X952).

" In invalidating the statutes, the trial court stated: "The problem posed by these statutes has many
facets. Yet essentially they raise but one basic question-How far may the state go in imposing restrictions
or conditions on employment as teachers in the public schools?
"In seeking the answer to this question it should be borne in mind that to impart the principles of
democracy, freedom of thought and speech must be preserved in the school setting. The atmosphere must
be one which encourages able independent men to enter the teaching profession. To develop good citizens
teachers must give students the facts, help them to learn to think and urge them to reach their own
conclusions. To so teach, the teacher must himself be free to think and speak. He must not be under
threat of enforced conformity to rigid standards; he must be free of blind censorship; he must be openminded to new ideas--even when they do not appear to be orthodox. The heart of American education
is independent thought." Leterman v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 196 Misc. 873, 877-78,
95 N.Y.S.2d 114, 1i8 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
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and the duty to screen the officials, teachers, and employees as to their fitness to maintain
the integrity of the schools as a part of ordered society, cannot be doubted.' 0
Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Justice Black. It is important in this study because it is the first opinion by a Supreme Court Justice to
expressly recognize academic freedom as a constitutional right. Justice Douglas said
in part :17
The Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and expression to everyone in our
society. All are entidled to it; and none needs it more than the teacher.
The public school is in most respects the cradle of our democracy ....
the impact of
this kind of censorship in the public school system illustrates the high purpose of the First
Amendment in freeing speech and thought from censorship....
The very threat of such a procedure is certain to raise havoc with academic freedom.... Fearing condemnation, [the teacher] will tend to shrink from any association
that stirs controversy. In that manner freedom of expression will be stifled....
There can be no real academic freedom in that environment. Where suspicion fills
the air and holds scholars in line for fear of their jobs, there can be no exercise of the
free intellect...
This system of spying and surveillance with its accompanying reports and trials cannot go hand in hand with academic freedom. It produces standardized thought, not the
pursuit of truth. Yet it was the pursuit of truth which the First Amendment was designed
to protect.... We need be bold and adventuresome in our thinking to survive.... The
Framers knew the danger of dogmatism; they also knew the strength that comes when
the mind is free, when ideas may be pursued wherever they lead. We forget these teachings of the First Amendment when we sustain this law.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting for jurisdictional reasons, nevertheless paid respect to
"the teacher's freedom of thought, inquiry, and expression," and to "the freedom of
thought and activity, and especially ... the feeling of such freedom, which are, as I
suppose no one would deny, part of the necessary professional equipment of teachers
8
in a free society."'
The same year in which it upheld the New York law the Court, in Wieman v.
Updegraff,9 invalidated an Oklahoma statute requiring all state officers and employees to take loyalty oaths that they were not, and had not been for the preceding
five years, members of organizations listed by the United States Attorney General as
communist front or subversive. The requirement was struck down because of its
indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing membership in such organizations. The action had been commenced because certain members of the faculty and
staff at Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College had refused to take the
oath. This circumstance prompted Justice Frankfurter to write a separate concurring opinion in which Justice Douglas joined. It is worth quoting at some length:2"
z'
Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 342 U.S. 485, 493 (r952).
'T Id. at 5o8-ii passim.
8
1d.
I at 504-05.
2934 4 U.S. 183 (1952).
0
2 d. at 195-97.
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... to require such an oath, on pain of a teacher's loss of his position in case of refusal to
take the oath, penalizes a teacher for exercising a right of association peculiarly characteristic of our people .... Such joining is an exercise of the rights of free speech and free
inquiry. By limiting the power of the States to interfere with freedom of speech and
freedom of inquiry and freedom of association, the Fourteenth Amendment protects all
persons, no matter what their calling. But, in view of the nature of the teacher's relation
to the effective exercise of the rights which are safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and by the
Fourteenth Amendment, inhibition of freedom of thought, and of action upon thought, in
the case of teachers brings the safeguards of those amendments vividly into operation.
Such unwarranted inhibition upon the free spirit of teachers affects not only those who,
like the appellants, are immediately before the Court. It has an unmistakable tendency to
chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice;
it makes for caution and timidity in their associations by potential teachers....
That our democracy ultimately rests on public opinion is a platitude of speech but not
a commonplace in action. Public opinion is the ultimate reliance of our society only if
it be disciplined and responsible. It can be disciplined and responsible only if habits of
open-mindedness and of critical inquiry are acquired in the formative years of our citizens.
The process of education has naturally enough been the basis of hope for the perdurance
of our democracy on the part of all our great leaders, from Thomas Jefferson onwards.
To regard teachers-in our entire educational system, from the primary grades to the
university-as the priests of our democracy is therefore not to indulge in hyperbole. It is
the special task of teachers to foster those habits of open-mindedness and critical inquiry
which alone make for responsible citizens, who, in turn, make possible an enlightened and
effective public opinion. Teachers must fulfill their function by precept and practice, by
the very atmosphere which they generate; they must be exemplars of open-mindedness and
free inquiry. They cannot carry out their noble task if the conditions for the practice of a
responsible and critical mind are denied to them. They must have the freedom of
responsible inquiry, by thought and action, into the meaning of social and economic ideas,
into the checkered history of social and economic dogma. They must be free to sift
evanescent doctrine, qualified by time and circumstance, from that restless, enduring process
of extending the bounds of understanding and wisdom, to assure which the freedoms of
thought, of speech, of inquiry, of worship are guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States against infraction by national or state government.
The functions of educational institutions in our national life and the conditions under
which alone they can adequately perform them are at the basis of these limitations upon
state and national power.

In 1957, in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire,2 the recognition of academic
freedom as a constitutional right moved from dissenting and concurring opinions

into acceptance by a majority of six members of the Supreme Court. In this case
the Court reversed a conviction of contempt entered against a professor who had
refused to answer questions asked by state authority concerning his connection with
the Progressive Party and the content of a lecture delivered at the state university.
There was no majority opinion, although six Justices concurred in the result. The
opinion of Chief Justice Warren, in which Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan
concurred, stated:'
±354 U.S. 234 (1957).
249-50.

"Id. at
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The State Supreme Court thus conceded without extended discussion that petitioner's
right to lecture and his right to associate with others were constitutionally protected freedoms which had been abridged through this investigation. These conclusions could not
be seriously debated. .

.

. These are rights which are safeguarded by the Bill of Rights

and the Fourteenth Amendment. We believe that there unquestionably was an invasion
of petitioner's liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political expression-areas in
which government should be extremely reticent to tread.
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost selfevident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those
who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders
inour colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made.
Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted
as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust.
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain
new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.
Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate concurring opinion in which Justice Harlan
joined. This opinion stated that,23
When weighed against the grave harm resulting from governmental intrusion into the
intellectual life of a university, such justification for compelling a witness to discuss the
contents of his lecture appears grossly inadequate....
These pages need not be burdened with proof, based on the testimony of a cloud of
impressive witnesses, of the dependence of a free society on free universities. This means
the exclusion of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university. It
matters little whether such intervention occurs avowedly or through action that inevitably
tends to check the ardor and fearlessness of scholars, qualities at once so fragile and so
indispensable for fruitful academic labor....
... in these matters of the spirit inroads on legitimacy must be resisted at the incipiency.
This kind of evil grows by what it is allowed to feed on.
The last case to be noted at this time is Barenblatt v. United State. 4 Here the
Court, by a five-to-four decision, upheld the contempt conviction of a professor who
had refused to answer questions concerning his membership in the Communist Party
propounded by a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Harlan, distinguished the case from Sweezy
inthat the Communist Party and the Progressive Party were "very different thing[s]"
and that the interrogation as to the content of a lecture was a factor absent from
the Barenblatt case. What interests us here, however, is the fact that at the very
beginning of his opinion, Justice Harlan stated that,2 5
3

" 1d. at 261-63.
is36o U.S. 1o9 (1959).

"5 Id. at It2. The relationship between the freedoms of teacher and student was expressed in 1831
by Thomas Cooper, in defending himself against removal from South Carolina College:
"If doubts bearing on the subject are concealed and not discussed, the students will have reason
to complain of injustice. The difficulties which a professor is forbidden to approach will remain on their
minds, and they will depart unsatisfied with half knowledge and doubts unresolved. They have a right
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Of course, broadly viewed, inquiries cannot be made into the teaching that is pursued
in any of our educational institutions. When academic teaching-freedom and its corollary
learning-freedom, so essential to the well-being of the Nation, are claimed, this Court will
always be on the alert against intrusion by Congress into this constitutionally protected
domain.
The leading dissenting opinion, written by Justice Black and joined by Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, was based on broad first amendment grounds
and did not specifically discuss the existence of those freedoms in an academic context. Justice Brennan dissented separately on another ground. Since these four
dissenting Justices are the same four for whom Chief Justice Warren spoke in the
Sweezy case, it may be assumed with confidence that they agree with the statement
of Justice Harlan quoted above. The Barenblatt case, therefore, demonstrates that,
as of 1959, all nine Justices of the Supreme Court had expressly recognized academic
freedom as being within the area of constitutional protection 6
III
DoCTINE
One formidable impediment to the judicial protection of academic freedom and
academic tenure, so far as teachers in state institutions are concerned, has been the
legal status of the teacher as a state employee. In the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries abortive efforts were made to establish that professors in private colleges
EMPLOYEE STATs-THE PRmVLEGE

had a "freehold" in their office, with tenure for life, of which they could not be
deprived except for cause and after a hearing2 7

Later cases raised the question,

depending upon the nature of the relief sought, whether professors in state universities were "officers" or "employees." ' Without resurrecting these decisions, it seems
sufficient to say that as of today, in both legal and economic relationship, teachers are
considered to be employees. From this fact many persons, including judges, have concluded that the payment of salary carries with it the right to control the content of
the teacher's research, publication, and teaching. Under this view, of course, there can
to expect from their professor no concealment, no shrinking from unpopular difficulties, but a full and
honest investigation, without suppression or disguise.
"Whatever temporary advantage may result from a timid suppression of truth, or a compliance with
unreasonable dictation, it is of great consequence to the permanent reputation of this College that students
shall come here with the expectation of being taught fully, impartially, and honestly, whatever they are
required to learn; and that they should leave this College with the impression that they have actually
been thus honestly taught; any impression that their teachers are directed or inclined to avoid difficulties,
because they are unpopular, or to suppress or conceal doubts that must arise hereafter, or any timid
manouvring [sic] in the mode of teaching, may serve the purpose of a narrow-minded caution, but it
is not fair; and therefore it does not become the reputation of this College or its professors." Quoted in
Hors'ramTER & MEarzoER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 268.
" One legal scholar in 1958, after reviewing the Court's decisions, confidently asserted that "The
interest in academic freedom stands forth as a recognized constitutional right," and using that as a
premise, went on to argue that interference with the right should be recognized as a tort. Cowan, Interference With Academic Freedom: The Pre-Natal History of a Tort, 4 WAYNE L. REv. 205 (1958).
"' See RicHARu HoFSrAnTr & WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT op ACADEMIc FREED0o
THE UNITED STATES 460-62 (1955).

i

"Id. at 463-66; Comment, Academic Freedom and the Law, 46 YALE LJ. 670, 672-74 (1937)-
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be no such thing as academic freedom. 2 It is undeniable that the claims of academic
freedom run counter to the usual prerogatives of an employer. If the claims are valid,
it must be because there is something different in the particular employee or the particular employment. Reflection quickly makes it apparent that a professor is something
different from just a "hired hand" and that his duties are not cut to the typical
employer-employee pattern.?' It is his possession of a specialized body of knowledgd
and wisdom, and his sustained mastery of it, which make his services valuable. It
is his function to acquire knowledge and to impart it to students and to the public.
His competence in his field is greater than that of those who retain him in the name
of the state. Although legally and economically he may be an employee, functionally
his usefulness is defeated if he is subject to the normal controls of employment in
his performance. Recurrence to the Supreme Court statements set forth previously
demonstrates beyond any doubt that the Court is very much aware of the uniqueness
and importance of the teaching function and the essentiality of academic freedom
in the performance of it. What has always been so in fact has now been recognized in law by the nation's highest tribunal.
Another obstacle to judicial protection has been erected as a corollary of the
teacher's status as an employee. This is the doctrine that public employment is a
privilege to be commenced, continued and terminated on such terms and conditions
as the government may determine, even though these terms may deny public'
employees constitutional rights generally enjoyed by other citizens 3 1 Two examples
" One classic statement is found in Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. xo5, 111, 289 SV.W 363, 364 (1927),
the famous "monkey" trial. "The plaintiff in error was a teacher in the public schools of Rhea county.
He was an employee of the state of Tennessee or of a municipal agency of the state. He was under
contract with the state to work in an institution of the state. He had no right or privilege to serve
the state except upon such terms as the state prescribed. . . . The statute before us . . . is an act of the
state as a corporation, a proprietor, an employer. It is a declaration of a master as to the character of
work the master's servant shall, or rather shall not, peform. In dealing with its own employees engaged
upon its own work, the State is not hampered by the limitations of. . . the Tennessee Constitution, nor of
the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States."
°The x915 Declaration of Principles, issued shortly after the founding of the AAUP, addressed
itself to the uniqueness of the university teacher's status and chose a striking analogy by which to
illustrate it. "These considerations make still more clear the nature of the relationship between university
trustees and members of university faculties. The latter are the appointees, but not in any proper
sense the employees, of the former. For, once appointed, the scholar has professional functions to
perform in which the appointing authorities have neither competency nor moral right to intervene. The
responsibility of the university teacher is primarily to the public itself, and to the judgment of his own
profession; and while, with respect to certain externals of his vocation, he accepts a responsibility to the
authorities of the institution in which he serves, in the essentials of his professional activity his duty is
to the wider public to which the institution itself is morally amenable. So far as the university teacher's
independence of thought and utterance is concerned-though not in other regards-the relationship of
professor to trustees may be compared to that between judges of the Federal courts and the Executive
who appoints them. University teachers should be understood to be, with respect to the conclusions
reached and expressed by them, no more subject to the control of the trustees than are judges subject to
the control of the President with respect to their decisions; while of course, for the same reason, trustees
are no more to be held responsible for, or to be presumed to agree with, the opinions or utterances of
professors than the President can be assumed to approve of all the legal reasonings of the courts." 40
A.A.U.P. BuLL. 98-99 (1954)31 See Dotson, The Emerging Doctrine of Privilege in Public Employment, 15 PuB. ADMiN. RRV. 77
(1955).
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of the application of this doctrine will suffice. In Bailey v. Richardson,3 the court
of appeals upheld the dismissal of a federal employee (not a teacher) under the
federal loyalty program, and disposed of the contention that the dismissal was a
33
violation of the guarantee of due process in bald and stark language:

The due process clause provides: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. .. ." It has been held repeatedly and consistently
that Government employment is not "property" and that in this particular it is not a contract. We are unable to perceive how it could be held to be "liberty." Certainly it is not
"life." So much that is clear would seem to dispose of the point. In terms the due
process clause does not apply to the holding of a government office.
And in the.Adler case, meeting the argument that the New York loyalty program
violated the teachers' rights of speech and association, Justice Minton made this
answer 34

It is clear that such persons have the right under our law to assemble, speak, and think
as they will. . .. It is equally clear that they have no right to work for the State in the
They may work for the school system upon the
school system on their own terms ....
reasonable terms laid down by the proper authorities of New York. If they do not choose
to work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go
elsewhere. Has the state thus deprived them of any right of free speech or assembly? We
think not. Such persons are or may be denied, under the statutes in question, the privilege
of working for the school system of the state of New York....
The seminal statement on which the doctrine of privilege in public employment
rests was made in 1892 by Justice Holmes, then on the Massachusetts bench. The
petitioner, Holmes said, "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman." 5 Those who quote this sentence as
authority do not usually quote the sentence which followed, for Holmes added:
"On the same principle the city may impose any reasonable condition upon holding
offices within its control." Even Justice Minton in Adler referred to the "reasonable
terms" laid down by New York. As Professor Fellman has observed, "There is a
vast difference between saying that government may deal with employees in its own
sovereign pleasure and saying that it is restricted to the imposition of 'reasonable
conditions.' ,3 This is the view which has now been accepted by the Supreme Court,
and significantly, in cases involving the rights of teachers.
Justice Frankfurter met the problem directly in his concurring opinion in a 1951
7
case involving an oath required by Los Angeles of its municipal employees:
The Constitution does not guarantee public employment....
But it does not at all follow that because the Constitution does not guarantee a right to
public employment, a city or a state may resort to any scheme for keeping people out
=' 86 U.S. App. D.C. 248, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. ig5o).

"Id. at 57.
v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).
"McAuliffe v. Mayor, Etc., of City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (1892).
"Fellman, supra note 2, at 12.
"Garner v. Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 76, 724-25 (195).

"Adler
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of such employment. Law cannot reach every discrimination in practice. But doubtless
unreasonable discriminations, if avowed in formal law, would not survive constitutional
challenge. Surely, a government could not exclude from public employment members of
a minority group merely because they are odious to the majority, nor restrict such
employment, say, to native-born citizens. To describe public employment as a privilege
does not meet the problem.
And Justice Douglas, dissenting in the New York teachers case, stated :"
I have not been able to accept the recent doctrine that a citizen who enters the public
service can be forced to sacrifice his civil rights .... The Constitution guarantees freedom
of thought and expression to everyone in our society. All are entitled to it; and none needs
it more than the teacher.
These views, expressed in dissent and concurrence, were shortly thereafter accepted
by the Court itself. In the Oklahoma oath case noted earlier, the Court reconsidered
the privilege concept and declined to follow it. Granting protection to the professors
in this case, the Court, speaking through Justice Clark, said:"9
We are referred to our statement in Adler that persons seeking employment in the New
York public schools have no right to work for the State in the school system on their
own terms ....

They may work for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid

down by the proper authorities of New York. . . . To draw from this language the facile
generalization that there is no constitutionally protected right to public employment is to
obscure the issue. For, in United Public Workers, though we held that the federal
government through the Hatch Act could properly bar its employees from certain types
of political activity thought inimical to the interests of the Civil Service, we cast this holding
into perspective by emphasizing that Congress could not "enact a regulation providing
that no Republican, Jew or Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or that no federal
employee shall attend Mass or take any active part in missionary work. .. ." We need not
pause to consider whether an abstract right to public employment exists. It is sufficient
to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion
pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.
It could not be denied that these same limitations are applicable to the states as well
as to Congress. It would seem equally undeniable that a standard which would be
invalid if included in a statute would be equally invalid if applied to an individual
in a particular case. And surely a standard which would not justify exclusion from
employment would not justify termination of existing employment. Several years
later in another case involving a professor the Court granted protection and again
through Justice Clark dismissed the privilege doctrine briefly: ° "To state that a
person does not have a constitutional right to government employment is only to say
that he must comply with reasonable, lawful, and non-discriminatory terms laid
down by the proper authorities."
It is clear from these expressions that the Court has consciously rejected the
doctrine of privilege so far as public employment is concerned, and in its stead, has
"8 Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952).
"Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952).
" Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of the City of New York, 350 U.S. 551, 555 (z956).
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adopted a minimum position that public employment may not be lawfully conditioned upon a denial of the employee's freedom of speech or association, freedom
of religious exercise, or freedom from discrimination. As we have seen, academic
freedom is usually defined in terms of those elements included in the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and communication, and this is the sense in which it has
been recognized explicitly by the Supreme Court. If the Court's language means

anything at all, it would necessarily follow that no public educational institution
may validly discharge a teacher for engaging in protected speech and communication.
The teacher's status as a public employee, instead of being a justification for denying
him his academic freedom, has now become the source of its protection, since his
employer, the state, is the very authority whose power is limited by the Constitution.
As Professor Cowan has aptly expressed it, ".

.

. the contention that the state as

employer has greater rights than the state as a political sovereign has disappeared.""'
Constitutional law thus protects academic freedom by defining it in terms of
constitutional guarantees and then recognizing that these guaranteees are limitations
upon the state's power to terminate employment. So stated, the proposition seems
so self-evident that one who was unfamiliar with all of the cases to the contrary
might pause to wonder that we have only so recently come to this result. Even yet,,
however, it is not a result which is universally recognized and accepted.
IV
FIFTH

AMFNDMENT-FREEDoM OF AssociAToN

It would be going too far to say that the Court has held that no exercise of a
constitutional right may ever validly support termination of employment. This is.
shown by the fifth amendment cases which have arisen out of loyalty and security
programs and especially out of inquiry into membership in the Communist Partyor other subversive organizations. A decade ago, when the issue first becameprominent, the academic world was divided over the rights and duties of professors.
and institutions in this area. The furor has largely subsided, and will not be resurrected here. The holdings of the cases are an important measure of the constitutional
freedom of the teacher. In Slochower v. Board of Higher Education,4 the New
York City charter provided that whenever an employee of the city utilized the
privilege of self-incrimination to avoid answering a question relating to his official
conduct, his term or tenure of office or employment should terminate and the
office or employment should be vacant. Slochower, an associate professor at
Brooklyn College, a public institution, invoked the privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment before an investigating committee of the United
States Senate, which interrogated him as to former membership in 'the Communist Party. As a result he was summarily discharged. The discharge was
upheld by the New York courts and reversed by the Supreme Court. The Court
" Cowan, supra note 26, at
d2350 U.S. 551 (1956).

219.
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held that the discharge violated due process because, as the Court viewed the
matter, New York had drawn the inference from the fifth amendment plea that
Slochower was guilty of some offense or that he had committed perjury. An inference of guilt from a fifth amendment plea was not permissible, said the Court,

because it would "impute a sinister meaning to the exercise of a person's constitutional
right." The practical effect was that the questions asked were taken as confessed
and made the basis of discharge. Stripped of the inference, the discharge fell
as being an arbitrary action wholly without support.
Subsequent cases have eroded the result, if not the reasoning, of Slochower. The
fifth amendment plea is not, under present decisions, available in a state inquiry.
But even when it is properly invoked in a federal proceeding, the states, by recasting
the rationale and ground for discharge, have been upheld in their right to terminate
employment for refusal to answer questions relating to membership in subversive
organizations. Thus, in Lerner v. Casey,43 the Court upheld the discharge of a
subway conductor for refusal to answer such questions under a statute which authorized discharge when reasonable grounds existed for belief that the employee was "of
doubtful trust and reliability."

In Nelson and Globe v. Los Angeles,44 the Court

upheld the discharge of a social worker for refusal to answer such questions under
a statute which made such refusal "insubordination." In both cases the Court found
that no inference of guilt had been drawn from the refusal to answer and on this
basis distinguished Slochower. Beilan v. Board of Education" involved the dis-

charge of a teacher who had refused to answer questions by the public school
superintendent as to his membership in subversive organizations. The discharge
was based upon the statutory ground of "incompetency" which was interpreted
by the state court to include the refusal to answer such questions. The Supreme
Court upheld the discharge, again noting that no inference had been drawn from
the teacher's refusal to answer. In its opinion the Court stated that,4
By engaging in teaching in the public schools, petitioner did not give up his right to
freedom of belief, speech or association. He did, however, undertake obligations of
frankness, candor and cooperation in answering inquiries made of him by his employing
Board examining into his fitness to serve it as a public school teacher.
The result has been the same when the refusal to answer questions regarding

Communist membership was based on the first amendment. The leading case is
Barenblatt v. United States," where the Supreme Court, after making the reference
previously quoted to the "constitutionally protected domain" of academic freedom,
4
stated :
As357 U.S. 468 (1958).

"362 U.S. i (i96O).

" 357 U.S. 399 (1958).

'told. at 405.
8

36o U.S. io9 (1959).

I'
d.at

112.
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But this does not mean that the Congress is precluded from interrogating a witness merely

because he is a teacher. An educational institution is not a constitutional sanctuary from
inquiry into matters that may otherwise be within the constitutional legislative domain
merely for the reason that inquiry is made of someone within its walls.
Later in its opinion the Court said that "We think that investigatory power in this
domain is not to be denied Congress solely because the field of education is involved."4 Still later the Court said that it could not "fairly be concluded that this
investigation was directed at controlling what is being taught at our universities
rather than at overthrow" [of the government] .
Nor has freedom of speech and association been availing as a defense against a
state requirement of an oath disclaiming membership in the Communist Party or
other subversive organizations. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the
power of a state to require such an oath of its employees, including teachers. It has
laid down, however, the important qualification that the state may not predicate
termination of employment on refusal to take the oath or on membership in an
organization covered by the oath unless the employee had knowledge of the organization's unlawful nature and purpose. Innocent membership, therefore, may not be
the basis of termination, either directly or indirectly through an oath requirement.
The Court has also held that an oath may be so broad, vague, ambiguous and indefinite as to violate due process for that reason 1
The sum total of the foregoing cases seems to be that the teacher, like other
employees, has no constitutional right to be free from inquiry, federal or state, as to
his membership in the Communist Party or other subversive organizations, and that
his employment may be terminated for refusing to respond to such inquiry or for
knowing membership in such an organization. The Court has been sharply divided,
however, and the cases in which state power was upheld against private right have
frequently been five to four decisions. For this reason it may fairly be concluded
that, even if these decisions are not overruled, they indicate the maximum limit of
the state's power, at least as to political speech and association, to inquire or predicate
termination. This conclusion is supported also by the Sweezy case, where the
Court held that inquiry as to membership in the Progressive Party exceeded constitutional limits. As Justice Frankfurter put it in his concurring opinion, "Whatever,
on the basis of massive proof and in the light of history.., be the justification for
not regarding the Communist Party as a conventional political party, no such
justification has been afforded in regard to the Progressive Party .... This precludes the questioning that petitioner resisted in regard to that Party.' 2 The Justice
also noted, "It cannot require argument that inquiry would be barred to ascertain
whether a citizen had voted for one or the other of the two major parties. .. 53
"Id. at 129.
"Id. at 130.
"1Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, Florida, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
82 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 266 (957).
53 ibid.
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And Chief Justice Warren noted that "History has amply proved the virtue of political
activity by minority, dissident groups .... Mere unorthodoxy or dissent from the
'
prevailing mores is not to be condemned."54
Outside the political area, the Court has recently protected the freedom of association of teachers in the case of Shelton v. Tucker.5 An Arkansas statute required
every teacher in a state-supported school or college, as a condition of employment, to
file annually an affidavit listing without limitation every organization to which he had
belonged or regularly contributed within the preceding five years. A professor at the
University of Arkansas and a teacher at Little Rock Central High School brought
actions, in state and federal courts respectively, challenging the validity of the affidavit
requirement. Both courts sustained the statute, but the Supreme Court reversed.
"The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms," the court stated, "is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools." Many of the relationships
required to be reported "could have no possible bearing upon the teacher's occupational competence or fitness." The Court concluded that the affidavit requirement,
in its "unlimited and indiscriminate sweep," went "far beyond what might be
justified in the exercise of the State's legitimate inquiry into the fitness and competency of its teachers."5 Justice Frankfurter was on the other side. "If I dissent
from the Court's disposition in these cases," he said,5"
it is not that I put a low value on academic freedom.... It is because that very freedom
in its most creative reaches, is dependent in no small part upon the careful and discrim.
inating selection of teachers.... Of course, if the information gathered by the required
affidavits is used to further a scheme of terminating the employment of teachers solely
because of their membership in unpopular organizations, that use will run afoul of the
fourteenth amendment.
In the proceeding below in the Shelton case, the federal court had invalidated an
Arkansas statute making it unlawful for a member of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People to be employed by the state of Arkansas or any
of its subdivisions. The result seems correct beyond any possible argument. It may
be taken, therefore, that a basis which would not support official inquiry could not
be a valid basis for termination. And under Justice Frankfurter's view, the basis
of termination is more limited than the basis of inquiry.
These cases protecting the teacher's freedom of association are clearly relevant
to the teacher's freedom of speech generally and especially to his "teaching-freedom."
Freedom of association is a right closely allied to and cognate with freedom of
speech. The scope of protection extended to the one is largely co-extensive with
that accorded to the other. The constitutional protection recognized by the court in
Sweezy and Shelton as to a teacher's associational freedom must be no less as to
" Id. at 251.
,5364 U.S. 479 (i96o).
"Id. at 487-90 passim.
SId. at 495-96.
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his beliefs or his written and oral expressions of them. What a teacher says and

writes, therefore, is also constitutionally protected, even though the views expressed
may be "unorthodox" or "dissident" or "unpopular." That such views are protected
by the first amendment the Supreme Court has said time and time again. The
only novelty here is the suggestion that this may still be true when such views are

held or expressed by teachers.
V
RELEVANCE OF FITNESS

Is it possible to extract from the Court's decisions a controlling principle which
marks the dividing line between the state's lawful power to terminate employment
and the employee's exercise of constitutional rights? I believe that answer may be
indicated by the fact that, in the cases upholding the state's power of inquiry into
associations and memberships of teachers and other employees, the Supreme Court
has consistently related the inquiry to the state's right to determine fitness and
competency. Thus, in an early oath case, Garner V. Board of Public Works, the
Court stated:" "We think that a municipal employer is not disabled because it is an
agency of the State from inquiring of its employees as to matters that may prove
relevant to their fitness and suitability for the public service." Succeeding cases
involving teachers have all emphasized the point. In Adler the Court observed,
"That the school authorities have the right and the duty to screen the officials,
teachers, and employees as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools
as a part of ordered society, cannot be doubted."5 In Slochower the Court said
60
that,
It is one thing for the city authorities themselves to inquire into Slochower's fitness, but
quite another for his discharge to be based entirely on events occurring before a federal
committee whose inquiry was announced as not directed at "the property, affairs, or
government of the city, or . . . official conduct of city employees." In this respect the
present case differs materially from Garner, where the city was attempting to elicit information necessary to determine the qualifications of its employees.
In Beilan the Court cited all the foregoing authority and added that "We find no
requirement in the Federal Constitution that a teacher's classroom conduct be the
sole basis for determining his fitness." 1 We have already seen in Shelton that the
irrelevance to fitness was a principal reason for the invalidation of the affidavit
requirement.
This repeated importance attached to the relevance of the inquiry to the fitness
of the teacher suggests that this is the key factor in the Court's decisions. Such
relevance would seem to be equally a limitation on the power to terminate employ" Garner v. Board of Public Works of the City of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716, 720 ('95').
" Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952).
" Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of the City of New York, 350 U.S. 551, 558 (1956).
" Beilan v. Board of Public Education, School District of Philadelphia, 357 U.S. 399, 4o6 (958).
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ment as on the power of original inquiry. The requirement of relevance to fitness
excludes from the state's legitimate interest, and leaves within the teacher's right,
associations and speech and publication which are not related to his fitness but are
merely unpopular, unorthodox, or controversial. The requirement of relevance to
fitness also suggests the broader possibility of a limitation on the state's power
where the basis of termination is outside the area of speech and association. If such
relevance is absent, then the termination may be considered to be arbitrary and
therefore a violation of due process. As the Court noted in Beilan, "Fitness for
teaching depends upon a broad range of factors.""2 One can readily think of many
such factors-homosexuality, drunkenness, narcotics addiction-which would raise
no constitutional questions so far as their relevance to fitness is concerned. Typically,
however, even where there is a statute or regulation setting forth the grounds for
discharge, there will be a catch-all phrase such as "conduct unbecoming a teacher"
or "conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the University." Experience demonstrates that many a teacher or professor has been discharged under some such
phrase, for reasons quite unrelated to his fitness. The due process theory set forth
above offers a means of challenging such arbitrary action, and would thus reach
many cases not falling within the speech-association category.
VI
REcENT STATE CASES

As of today, only three Supreme Court decisions-Wieman, Slochower, and
Shelton-have invalidated the substantive basis for termination of a teacher's employment. In none of these did the Court expressly find a violation of the teacher's
academic freedom. There is no reason to doubt the Court's sincerity that it will
always be on the alert to protect against invasion of this "constitutionally protected
domain." And yet until there is a decision from the Court invalidating a termination
squarely for the reason that it violated academic freedom, it may be expected that
the state courts and lower federal courts will be reluctant to take the lead in granting
relief in an area heretofore within the almost plenary power of university authorities.
8
Consider the recent case of Koch v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois."
Koch was an assistant professor of biology employed under a two-year contract.
About half-way through the first year the university newspaper published a letter
written by Koch in response to an earlier letter written by two students criticizing
standards of sexual morality at the University. Koch's letter, in the language of
the appellate court, "contained a rather liberal approach to the problems concerning
morality on modern day university campuses," and among other things, asserted
that "premarital intercourse among college students is not, in and of itself, improper."
The president of the university, conceiving that Koch's views were "offensive, re2

Ibid.

"339 111.App.2d 51, 187 N.E.2d 340 (1962).
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pugnant and contrary to commonly accepted standards of morality and his espousal
of these views could be interpreted as an encouragement of immoral behavior and
that for these reasons he should be relieved of his University duties," so relieved him.
A faculty committee, after a hearing, recommended reprimand rather than discharge,
but the board of trustees ordered discharge at the end of the first contract year.
Koch then brought an action for breach of contract, which was dismissed on motion
by the trial court. Under Illinois practice, an appeal was taken directly to the
state supreme court, "alleging the existence of a constitutional issue." Defendant's
motion to transfer the appeal to the appellate court on the ground that "no constitutional issues were involved" was sustained. The appellate court then affirmed the
dismissal of the entire case.
The disposition by the Illinois Supreme Court was both unfortunate and inexplicable. The case could have served as a useful one in which to illuminate the
area of a professor's freedom of speech. Certainly Koch's views were "unorthodox"
and "unpopular" and therefore prima facie within the area of protection staked out
by the Supreme Court. Whatever the decision on the merits might have been, it is
palpably incorrect to assert that no constitutional question was involved. It is
difficult to believe that the Illinois Supreme Court would not hold the expression of
such views constitutionally protected from state sanction if the utterance had been
by a private citizen. To say that no constitutional issue is raised when a professor
is discharged for expressing them can only mean that, although the speech is protected, the speaker is not. The assertion of the Illinois Supreme Court, then, simply
demonstrates a judicial reluctance to recognize that a professor may have the same
freedom of speech as other citizens. It must be conceded that in some instances
this may well be true. Here an analogy may be drawn to the employer "free
speech" cases under the National Labor Relations Act. There the NLRB and the
courts have recognized that the employer-employee relationship and the physical
environment in which management speaks may render certain employer speech
coercive and hence unprotected. Similarly, the teacher-student relationship and the
forum of the classroom may serve, in certain situations, as limitations upon a professor's "teaching" freedom. No one would claim, for example, that the state
could punish utterance of risque stories in the living room or even in a dinner
address, and yet teaching freedom would probably not protect their utterance in the
classroom. Again, the mathematics professor could not consistently use classroom
time to expound his political views and successfully claim it was his constitutional
right. But no such qualifications were present in the Koch case, and one can but
regret that the most importance issue of the case was never discussed.
A recent case, [ones v. Board of Control," was brought by a law professor at the
University of Florida whose employment was terminated by the president of the
university before the expiration of his one-year contract. The reason for the dis04 131 So.2d 713 (Fla. 196I).
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missal was his violation of a rule of the Board of Control, the governing body of the

state university, which prohibited employees under the board's jurisdiction from
seeking election to public office, and requiring any employee desiring to engage in
a political campaign for public office to submit his resignation. Jones' violation of
the rule was his filing of qualifying papers to run in a primary election for circuit

judge. The president's action was upheld by the board, and Jones brought a breach
of contract action seeking the salary for the remainder of his contract term. One
of the arguments advanced by Jones was that the board rule was an unreasonable
encroachment upon his right as a citizen to run for public office and also an unreasonable violation of his academic freedom.
The Supreme Court of Florida did not think much of "academic freedom" which
it put in quotes each time the term was used, presumably because the court could
find no "definitive meaning" of the term in the briefs or in any authorities. The
court then stated:0

As contended for by the appellant, however, we understand the expression "academic
freedom" to comprehend a claimed privilege of scholars and academicians and teachers
generally to teach without restriction either to subject matter or as to limitation on col-

lateral activities. Should we adopt literally the position of the appellant, it appears to us
that we would be compelled to concede that a license to teach in a public school system
is subject to no regulations whatsoever regarding either the nature of the subject matter
to be taught or the time and effort that may be required to be devoted to the classrooms.
This was certainly not the position taken in the appellant's brief. Nowhere in the

brief was it contended that academic freedom was a "privilege," that it was "without
restriction or limitation" or that it was "subject to no regulations whatsoever."
So far as I know, no responsible advocate of academic freedom has ever taken such
a position. The argument actually made in the brief was that the Board's rule was
an unreasonableinterference with academic freedom, an argument later recognized
by the court itself. While the court rejected the concept of academic freedom, it
did not base its decision on the privilege doctrine, "although we might appropriately
do so," but upon the principle that public employment must necessarily be subject
to reasonable rules and regulations. Applying the test of reasonableness, the court
upheld the board rule on the grounds that political campaigns would make inordinate
demands upon the time and energies of the professor, would potentially subject
students to political influences, and would potentially involve the university.
VII
THE TEAcimR's FREEDOM AS CITIZEN

The Jones case is unique in that virtually all of the cases challenging termination
for extra-curricular activity have involved public school teachers. The distinction
is frequently made between the teacher's academic freedom and his extra-curricular

'l id. at 717.
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freedom as a citizen. The validity of the distinction depends upon the sanction

which is imposed. If a teacher is punished as a citizen for what he has said or written
as a citizen, no question of academic freedom arises. But when he may not be
punished constitutionally as a citizen, and is instead removed from his position as a
teacher, I cannot conclude other than that his academic freedom has been violated.
The thought behind the distinction seems to be that the teacher's extra-curricular
freedom is the same as that of other citizens, and his academic freedom is something
special to his own profession. Actually, as the public school teacher cases starkly
reveal, the teacher's problem, in the extra-curricular world, has been to get as much
legal protection as other citizens, and in the academic world, to get any legal protection at all. So far as constitutional protection is concerned, the Supreme Court
decisions recognize both the teacher's "teaching-freedom" and also his freedom as
a citizen.

6
5a

Nor do the decisions thus far recognize any distinction, so far as constitutional
protection is concerned, between university or college professors and teachers in the

primary and secondary schools. But, as Emerson and Haber have pointed out,60
Problems of academic freedom at elementary and secondary educational levels would
appear to differ at some points from the issues raised at the level of higher education.
Thus the lack of maturity of the students may be thought to require different teaching
methods as well as different controls over the teaching staff.

Eventually, therefore, the decisions may recognize a difference in the scope of
constitutional protection, although it would appear that any lesser protection for
the grade school teacher would be justified only as to his curricular freedom.
VIII
ACADEMIC TENURE AND AcADEMIc DUE PRocEss

But substantive freedoms in the abstract offer no protection to anyone. Nor are
they self-enforcing. In this connection, Justice Frankfurter has observed that "the
"'But see Lovejoy, supra note ii: "In some cases teachers have been dismissed or otherwise penalized
because of their exercise, outside the university, of their ordinary political or personal freedom in a
manner or for purposes objectionable to the governing authorities of their institutions. While such
administrative action is contrary in spirit to academic freedom, it is primarily a special case of the abuse
of the economic relation of employer and employee for the denial of ordinary civil liberties."
And consider Ho srADTER & METZoER, Op. cit. supra note s2, at 405: "The attempt to assimilate the
doctrine of free speech into the doctrine of academic freedom aroused hostility in certain quarters. It
seemed to demand a special protection for professors when they engaged in the rough give-and-take
of politics. To argue that the institutional position of professors should not be affected by what they said
as citizens was to urge immunity for them from the economic penalties that may repay unpopular utterances-the dwindling of clients, the boycott of subscribers, the loss of a job. Such a demand for immunity, exceeding anything provided by the constitutional safeguard of free speech, going even further
than the 'free-market' conceptions of the great philosophers of intellectual liberty, was bound to strain
the less tensile tolerance of American trustees and administrators." It may be noted that the philosophers
of intellectual liberty were not writing in the context of a written constitution which imposes on the
state in its capacity as an employer limitations subject to growth and development through the judicial
process.
a' THomAs I. EMaRsoN & DAVID HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1022

<1958).
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history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards."6 7 And so it has been with academic freedom. From the beginning it has
been recognized that academic freedom had a procedural as well as a substantive
aspect... The achievement and maintenance of the substantive freedom has been
considered to be dependent upon the creation of a system which would give the
teacher some measure of employment security. The surest and proven way to
stifle and discourage the teaching and publication of unpopular or controversial
opinions was, and still is, to discharge the teacher. Academic tenure, therefore, at an
early date was recognized as the necessary handmaiden of academic freedom. In
turn, the most efficacious way to protect academic tenure was the establishment of
and adherence to certain procedures which were to be followed if an appointment
was to be terminated. Academic due process and academic tenure thus became the
procedural means through which the end of academic freedom was to be achieved.
The importance of tenure and academic due process has been recognized by
academic authorities without exception.69
Hoftstadter and Metzger have discussed this point in interesting fashion. 70
The emphasis on bureaucratization changed the direction of the struggle for academic
freedom in this country. The fight for academic freedom became as a result a fight for
precautionary rules, for academic legislation, not merely one in which the battles were
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
" See the 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, reprinted in 40 A.A.U.P.

"

BU-.

90 (954).

" To quote Lovejoy again, ".., the chief practical requisite for academic freedom consists in guaranteed
security of tenure in professorial positions, unless removal for some grave cause (such as proved incompetence or moral delinquency), other than the content of the teaching of the professor concerned,
becomes necessary. Experience has shown that such cause may sometimes be officially alleged for dismissals which are in fact due to pressure from economic, sectarian or other groups desirous of restricting
freedom of teaching in some particular. Removal from professorial office should therefore be possible
only through some definite form of judicial procedure in which the faculty, as the local representatives
of the academic profession, should responsibly participate." Academic Freedom, I ENcYc. Soc. Sel 384,
386 (1930).

"The source of tenure is its relationship to academic
guarantee of freedom because it puts the instructor beyond
the quixotism of governing boards. . . . If freedom is the
tenure is the guarantee to the individual that his freedom is

freedom. Tenure is regarded as a major
the easy reach of administrative tyranny or
mark of strength, tenure is its symbol. For
real and not a shadow." Wriston, Academic

Tenure, 9 A-R-CAN SCHOLAR 339, 344 (194o).

"The essence of academic freedom is the right of the duly qualified scholar to carry on research, teaching, and publication without restraints or interference by the institution which employs him. As citizen
of a free state he has indeed the right to carry on these activities without restraint or interference on the
part of the public authorities; but the civil guarantees alone are insufficient to make the scholar free in his
pursuit of the truth. His ability to function as a scholar depends as a rule upon his continued occupancy
of his academic post; hence, without specific guaranties against arbitrary or disciplinary dismissal his civil
liberties are nugatory. It is therefore not strange that the movement for academic freedom centers in
security of tenure, nor that to many who view the matter cursorily academic liberty and security of
tenure mean the same thing, even though the establishment of security of tenure in itself is virtually the
creation of a property right rather than the realization of a form of personal liberty." Johnson, Academic
Freedom, in FREEDOM: ITs MEANING 200 (Ashen ed. 1940).
Professor Machlup states flatly that "Academic freedom cannot be secured without academic tenure."
Machlup, On Some Misconceptions Concerning Academic Freedom, 41 A.A.U.P. BULL. 753, 757 (1955).
10
Ric-IARD HoFsrAnRs & WALTER P. METEGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN TIE
UNITED STATES 456-57 (955).
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ex post facto attempts to rectify injustices. For good and for ill, academic freedom and
academic tenure have become inseparably joined. The good results are many. Too often,
the attempt to achieve vindication after a professor has been dismissed is little more than
a posthumous inquest; it is the better part of wisdom to look for and devise preventives.
Too often, the issues of an academic freedom case are obscured by the idle question of
motives; tenurial rules provide a standard whose infraction is more easily demonstrable.

The same authors, surveying in 1955 the academic freedom cases in which the AAUP
had participated, concluded that,7 '
The reported cases also justify the assumption that academic freedom is dependent upon
academic tenure and due process. In fully 63 of the 94 cases in which the administration
was held to blame, guarantees of tenure were absent and dismissal on short notice was
permitted by the institution. Indeed, the absence of law and fixed procedure was the
one element that these remiss institutions had in common. They were heterogeneous with
respect to size, geographical location, and form of control. They even varied with respect
to scholarly importance. ....

Clearly, there was a problem antecedent to and inclusive

of the problem of protecting freedom, and that was the problem of establishing a government of law, not of whim.
These academic convictions are reflected in the 1940 Statement of Principles,
which sets forth at some length proper and acceptable standards of tenure and also
discusses the desirable procedure to be followed for termination of an appointment.
Promoting the acceptance and observance of academic tenure and due process requirements is the program which has been assumed by the American Association of
University Professors since its organization in 1915, and with increasing success over
the years. Thus by 1959 a leading study of tenure plans in higher education was

able to report that "The tenure idea is almost universally accepted," even though
it was "embodied in a bewildering variety of policies, plans, and practices."72
There had not been, however, any corresponding increase in the judicial protection
73
available to the teacher. The authors of the study concluded that,

Legal protection of tenure is insubstantial. Judicial reluctance to decree specific performance of "personal service" contracts, charter provisions authorizing discharge at will,
disclaimer and finality clauses, confusing uncertainty in the written plans of some institutions, the complete absence of formal plans in others, the vagueness and inconclusiveness
of termination criteria, and retention of ultimate decisional authority by most governing
boards-all underscore the hazards of reliance on judicial protection of tenure.
Another recent study has also emphasized the difficulties in achieving legal protection of tenure and has suggested possibilities for improvement' 4
5• 2 Id.

at 493-94.
CLARK BYsE & Louis JOUGoHN, TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUcATION 132-33 (1959).

"'1d.at 136.
" Davis, Enforcing Academic Tenure: Reflections and Suggestions, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 200.

See also

Byse, Academic Freedom, Tenure, and the Law: A Comment on Worzella v. Board of Regents, 73 HA-tv.
L. REV. 304 (1959).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

472

Ix
SuPREME CouRT DECiSIONS ON RIGHT TO HEARING

The Supreme Court, in another series of decisions, has opened up the possibility
of a substantial degree of protection of academic due process, and as a result
academic tenure, under the Constitution. The concept of due process, of course,
is one which is drawn directly from constitutional law. As we know, due process
has both a substantive and a procedural aspect. In its substantive aspect it includes
within the fourteenth amendment as limitations upon the states the great freedoms
which the first amendment protects against infringement by the national government.
It is substantive due process which makes academic freedom the constitutional
right of teachers in state colleges and universities. Substantive due process is of
relatively modern origin so far as the United States Constitution is concerned, dating
only since around 189o. Our immediate concern at this point, however, is with
procedural due process. Historically, procedural due process may be traced directly
as far back as 1215 when, in Magna Carta, the Crown agreed, as to a limited class
of persons, not to proceed summarily but only after notice and hearing given in
accordance with "the law of the land" Succeeding generations of English judges
strongly condemned governmental action against individuals without giving them
notice and hearing, drawing upon philosophical and Biblical sources to support
their conclusion. In American constitutional law, the due process guarantee has
been interpreted to require fair procedure, and the basic and essential elements
of fair procedure have been held to be, under both federal and state constitutions,
notice and hearing as prerequisites to the imposition of sanctions. The following
statement of the Supreme Court is typical. "The due process clause requires that
every man shall have the protection of his day in court, and the benefit of the
general law, a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds not arbitrarily
or capriciously, but upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial... ."7 This
has been held with respect to administrative action in many fields as well as in
judicial proceedings. Of specific importance in our context are those cases which
indicate that public institutions violate constitutional due process if they discharge
teachers without giving them notice and an opportunity for a hearing.
Adler v. Board of Education76 is the first case to which attention should be
directed. The statute provided for a listing by the Board of Regents, after notice
and hearing, of organizations seen to be subversive within the meaning of the act.
It also provided for the dismissal, again after notice and hearing, of teachers who
were members of the listed organizations. By state court interpretation, this had been
held to mean membership with knowledge of the organization's unlawful purpose.
Such membership, the act declared, "shall constitute prima facie evidence of disqualification" for employment as a teacher. It was argued that this was a denial of
due process on the ground that the fact found bore no relation to the fact presumed.
" Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332
"

(1921).

Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
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After denying that the presumption was an unreasonable one, Justice Minton, for
the court, said: "Nor is there here a problem of procedural due process. The presumption is not conclusive but arises only in a hearing where the person against
whom it may arise has full opportunity to rebut it." He then quoted with approval
the following language of the New York Court of Appeals :W
"The presumption growing out of a prima facie case ... remains only so long as there is no
substantial evidence to the contrary. When that is offered the presumption disappears,
and, unless met by further proof, there is nothing to justify a finding based solely upon
it" (quoting Potts v. Pardee, 220 N.Y. 431, 433, 116 N.E. 78, 79 (1917)).

Thus the

phrase "prima facie evidence of disqualification" as used in the statute, imports a
hearing at which one who seeks appointment to or retention in a public school position
shall be afforded an opportunity to present substantial evidence contrary to the presumption sanctioned by the prima facie evidence. .

.

.

Once such contrary evidence has

been received, however, the official who made the order of ineligibility has thereafter the
burden of sustaining the validity of that order by a fair preponderance of the evidence ....
Should an order of ineligibility then issue, the party aggrieved thereby may avail himself
of the provisions for review prescribed by the section of the statute.. .. In that view
there here arises no question of procedural due process (quoting Thompson v. Wallin,
301 N.Y. 476, 494, 95 N.E.zd 8o6, 814-15 (1950)).

The clear inference of the case is that if the teacher had not been given the
opportunity in a hearing to prove either non-membership or that membership was
innocent, the discharge would have violated procedural due process. The hearing
required by the statute was thus required by due process to be one in which the
teacher had an opportunity to controvert the facts which were decisive of the
question of disqualification. The logic of the decision would seem to require the
same result regardless of the nature of the controverted fact and also to apply where
the fact is one found on the basis of evidence rather than by presumption. Thus, the
court was of the view that the finding of disqualification was one which had to be
supported by "substantial" evidence or by a "fair preponderance" of the evidence.
It may also be noted that the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding was
a question which could be reviewed judicially. Of course, this is no more than the
rule usually applied to the findings of administrative agencies, but it is of special
importance here because of the propensity of many courts in the past to refuse to
review the exercise of discretion in the operation of educational institutions.
The decision in Slochower v. Board of Higher Education7s rested on a procedural as well as a substantive ground. Under the statute involved, as interpreted
by the New York courts, dismissal of the employee for pleading self-incrimination
was automatic, without any right to notice, charges, hearing or opportunity to explain. The fact that discharge was automatic with no opportunity for a hearing
meant that,"0
"'Id.at 495.96.
78 350 U.S. 551 (x956).

" Id. at 558.
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No consideration is given to such factors as the subject matter of the questions, remoteness
of the period to which they are directed, or justification for the exercise of the privilege.
It matters not whether the plea resulted from mistake, inadvertence or legal advice
conscientiously given, whether wisely or unwisely.
The Supreme Court's opinion stated that ". . . we conclude the summary dismissal
of appellant in the circumstances of this case violates due process of law." In discussing the procedural invalidity of the professor's discharge, Justice Clark wrote :80
This is not to say that Slochower has a constitutional right to be an associate professor of
German at Brooklyn College. The state has broad powers in the selection and discharge
of its employees, and it may be that proper inquiry would show Slochower's continued
employment to be inconsistent with a real interest of the state. But there has been no
such inquiry here. We hold that the summary dismissal of appellant violates due process
of law.
What was merely a matter of inference in Adler now became a square holding.
As noted, subsequent cases have eroded the substantive importance of Slochower,
but its procedural holding has not been impaired. Thus, in Beilan v. Board of
Education,"' the teacher had, prior to discharge, been accorded a formal hearing
with counsel; therefore the procedural due process question did not arise. In
Nelson and Globe v. Los. Angeles, 2 the discharge had been a summary one, without
any notice or hearing, but in his appeal to the Supreme Court, the employee did not
make the failure to give him a hearing one of the issues. The Court commented
on this fact in its opinion: "But petitioner here raises no such point, and clearly
asserts that 'whether or not petitioner Globe was accorded a hearing is not the
issue here'." 3 Since Globe based his whole case upon the substantive question, the
Court, consistent with its usual policy, did not pass upon any question of procedural
due process. In Lerner v. Casey,8 4 the statute required the dismissal to be "after
investigation" and based "upon all the evidence." It also gave the discharged employee a right of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, which could take further
evidence. Lerner appeared before the Department of Investigation three times, the
latter two accompanied by counsel. After his discharge, he did not appeal to the
Civil Service Commission, but brought an action in court for reinstatement. In its
decision, the Supreme Court stated:8 5
It is said that New York's statute deprives him of procedural due process in that it provides
for dismissal of employees in the first instance without a statutory right to a hearing, opportunity for cross-examination, or disclosure of the evidence on which dismissal is based.
However, appellant is in no position to complain of procedural defects in the statute. His
own refusal to answer blocked proceedings at his appearances before the Department of
" Id. at 559.

81 357 U.S. 399 (x958).
82 362 U.S. x (ig6o).
'lid. at 8.
84 357 U.S. 468 (1958).

" 1d. at 473.

AN

EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

Investigation, and more important he failed to pursue his administrative remedy by appealing to and obtaining a hearing before the State Civil Service Commission.
The Court's decision in Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v.
McElroy"8 is more troublesome. This case involved a cook employed by a private
employer at a cafeteria located on the premises of the Naval Gun Factory. On the
assertion that she failed to meet the security requirements of the installation but
without any hearing, she was required to turn in her identification badge and denied
further access to the premises. The Supreme Court upheld the summary action in an
equivocal opinion. Although the case involved private rather than public employment, the Court seemed to treat it as though it were the latter.
[The] question cannot be answered by easy assertion that, because she had no constitutional
right to be there in the first place, she was not deprived of liberty or property by the
Superintendent's action. "One may not have a constitutional right to go to Baghdad, but
the Government mayst not prohibit one from going there unless by means consonant with
due process of law"
After this seeming rejection of any privilege approach, the opinion then went on:88
"The Court has consistently recognized that an interest closely analogous to [the
cook's], the interest of a government employee in retaining his job, can be summarily
denied." Invoking older authorities, the Court stated that "It has become a settled
principle that government employment, in the absence of legislation, can be revoked
at the will of the appointing officer." Then, referring to more recent decisions, the
Court concluded :89
Those cases demonstrate only that the state and federal governments, even in the exercise
of their internal operations, do not constitutionally have the complete freedom of action
enjoyed by a private employer. But to acknowledge that there exist constitutional restraints
upon state and federal governments in dealing with their employees is not to say that
all such employees have a constitutional right to notice and a hearing before they can be
removed. We may assume that [the cook] could not constitutionally have been excluded
from the Gun Factory if the announced grounds for her exclusion had been patently
arbitrary or discriminatory-that she could not have been kept out because she was a
Democrat or a Methodist. It does not follow, however, that she was entitled to notice
and a hearing when the reason advanced for her exclusion was, as here, entirely
rational ....
0
Justice Brennan wrote a vigorous opinion for four dissentersY

if [petitioner's] badge had been lifted avowedly on grounds of her race, religion, or
political opinions, the Court would concede that some constitutionally protected interestwhether "liberty" or "property" it is unnecessary to state-had been injured.... I assume
for present purposes that separation as a "security risk," if the charge is properly established, is not unconstitutional. But the Court goes beyond that. It holds that the mere
8 367 U.S. 886 (ig6i).
...

8

ld. at 894.

88

Id. at 896.
8"Id. at 897-98.
90Id. at 90o-02.
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assertion by government that exclusion is for a valid reason forecloses further inquiry ....
Such a result in effect nullifies the substantive right-not to be arbitrarily injured by
Government-which the Court purports to recognize. What sort of right is it which
enjoys absolutely no procedural protection? . . . under today's holding petitioner is entitled to no process at all. She is not told what she did wrong; she is not given a chance
to defend herself. ... I cannot believe she is not entitled to some procedures.... In sum,
the Court holds that petitioner has a right not to have her identification badge taken
away for an "arbitrary" reason, but no right to be told in detail what the reason is, or to
defend her own innocence, in order to show, perhaps, that the true reason for deprivation
was one forbidden by the Constitution. That is an internal contradiction to which I cannot
subscribe.
*.. in my view, it is fundamentally unfair, and therefore violative of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, to deprive her of a valuable relationship so summarily.
In evaluating the majority holding, it is important to note that it rested largely
upon the traditional and historic power of military commanders to exclude civilians
from military installations. The cited cases which upheld summary discharge of
federal employees were nineteenth century cases arising under the spoils system, and
have clearly been undermined by the modern authorities. The Court did not purport
to be relying on a theory of privilege; instead, it analyzed the case in terms of the
respective interests involved, and stated that it was "under the circumstances of
this case" that no hearing was required. After all is said, however, it must be
conceded that the decision is an exception to the usual rule of the recent cases that
due process requires a hearing. It is not believed, however, that it impairs the
applicability of the general rule to the discharge of teachers.
A recent case is a strong indication that the Court in teacher cases still subscribes to the procedural holding in Slochower. Nostrand v. Littleol was an action
brought by two professors at the University of Washington challenging the validity
of a 1955 statute which required every public employee to subscribe to an oath that
he was not a subversive person or a member of the Communist Party or any subversive organization within the meaning of the act. The statute provided that
refusal to take the oath "on any grounds shall be cause for immediate termination
of such employee's employment. . . ." Interpreted to include scienter, the oath
requirement was upheld by the Washington Supreme Court. Appeal was taken
to the United States Supreme Court on both substantive and procedural grounds.
The result was a per curiam opinion addressed to the procedural question. The
Court stated .9
One of the claims is that no hearing is afforded at which the employee can explain or
defend his refusal to take the oath. The Supreme Court of Washington did not pass on
this point. The Attorney General suggests in his brief that prior to any decision thereon
here, "the Supreme Court of Washington should be first given the opportunity to consider
and pass upon" it. Moreover, appellants point to a recent case of the Washington Supreme
Court, City of Seattle v. Ross .. . as analogous. There that court overturned an ordinance
o'362 U.S. 474 (196o)2
1d.
I at 475.
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because it established a presumption of guilt without affording the accused an opportunity
of a hearing to rebut the same. In the light of these circumstances we cannot say how
the Supreme Court of Washington would construe this statute on the hearing point.

On the remand it was recognized in the state court that "Implicit in the remand is
the implication that, if we hold that such a hearing is not afforded by the act, it is.
'violative of due process.'-"3 The Washington Supreme Court delivered a highly
interesting opinion to which further reference will be made shortly. At this point
it is sufficient to note that the Washington court held that the professors would be
entitled to a hearing before they were discharged for refusal to take the oath. The
professors appealed from a judgment dismissing their complaint. This time the
Supreme Court dismissed their appeal "for want of a substantial federal question."'
Justice Douglas, dissenting, noted that "The disposition that the Court makes of the
case resolves one of the questions presented by the appeal, viz., that appellants are
entitled to a hearing before they can be discharged for refusing to take the oath."9"
He and Justice Black would have heard the case because of the substantive questions
presented.
Relevant at this point is the analogous situation dealt with in Dixon v. Alabama
State Board of Education9 involving the expulsion of students from a state college
for alleged misconduct stemming from their participation in sit-in demonstrations.
The students were give no notice or hearing prior to their expulsion. The district
court dismissed the case, but the court of appeals reversed. Emphasizing the importance of educational opportunity, the court stated:"
The precise nature of the private interest involved in this case is the right to remain at a

public institution of higher learning in which the plaintiffs were students in good standingIt requires no argument to demonstrate that education is vital and, indeed, basic to civilized
society. Without sufficient education the plaintiffs would not be able to earn an adequate
livelihood, to enjoy life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as possible the duties and
responsibilities of good citizens.

.

.

. expulsion may well prejudice the student in com-

pleting his education at any other institution. Surely no one can question that the right
to remain at the college in which the plaintiffs were students in good standing is an
interest of extremely great value.
The court concluded that "We are confident that precedent as well as a most fundamental constitutional principle support our holding that due process requires notice
and some opportunity for hearing before a student at a tax-supported college is
expelled for misconduct.' 9 6 The significance of this case for our purpose lies in its
recognition of the student's freedom to learn. This freedom is substantially impaired, however, if the teachers who instruct him do not enjoy a corresponding
freedom. The relation between the two was expressly recognized by the Supreme
Court in 1959 when it referred to "academic teaching-freedom and its corollary
03 361 P.2d 55!, 567 (Wash. 5965).
0
'Nostrand v. Little, 368 U.S. 436 (5962).
,5 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. I96I).
Slid. at 157-58.
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learning-freedom." The due process requirement of a hearing prior to dismissal of
either teacher or student supports the educational freedom which is composed of
the interwoven freedom of each.
The cases clearly support the teacher's right to a hearing before termination of
employment, at least where the reason for termination is allegedly unconstitutional.
They do not, however, discuss in any detail the nature of the hearing or what particulars it should include. The Court is notably reluctant to indulge in specifics in
this area. In a recent case involving the right to a hearing in another context, Chief
Justice Warren wrote:?
"Due process" is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content

varies according to specific factual contexts. Thus, when governmental agencies adjudicate
or make binding determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is
imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have traditionally been associated
with the judicial process.... Therefore, as a generalization, it can be said that due process

embodies the differing rules of fair play, which through the years, have become associated
with differing types of proceedings. Whether the Constitution requires that a particular

right obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature
of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that
proceeding, are all considerations which must be taken into account.
Justice Brennan adopted the same approach in his dissent in the McElroy case,08
when he said:
I do not mean to imply that petitioner could not have been excluded from the installation
-without the full procedural panoply of first having been subjected to a trial, with cross,examination and confrontation of accusers, and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
I need not go so far in this caseY9
Some clues are available, however, from the Court's decisions in the teacher cases.
As noted in Adler, the hearing required was one in which the teacher had an
-opportunity to controvert the facts which were decisive of the question of dis.qualification. And in Nostrand the Court referred to a hearing at which the pro.fessor "can explain or defend." These statements would certainly seem to indicate
.a hearing which would include a specification of charges, some knowledge of the
,evidence against the teacher, and some opportunity to present a defense with
-evidence in his own behalf. In all reason, these would seem to be the minimum
:essentials if the hearing were to serve any useful purpose at all. The opinion of the
court of appeals in the student expulsion cases is instructive on the point. "The
notice," said the court,100
should contain a statement of the specific charges and grounds which, if proven, would
justify expulsion under the regulations of the Board of Education. The nature of the

hearing should vary depending upon the circumstances of the particular case.
1

7

Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (ig6o).

11 Cafeteria

& Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (x961).
" Id. at goo.
t00
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d X5o, x58 (5th Cir. g6i).
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In the situation before it, the court said "something more than an informal interview"

was required. That something more was a hearing which would give "an opportunity to hear both sides in considerable detail." The court made it plain that "a
full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to cross-examine witnesses," was not required. But, to preserve "the rudiments of an adversary proceeding," the court said
that the student should be given the names of the witnesses against him, a report
on the testimony of each witness, and an opportunity to present his own defense
and testimony or affidavits in his behalf.
The Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings, 10 '
approved by the Council of American Association of University Professors in
1957 and by the Association of American Colleges in 1958, goes into considerable
detail in setting forth recommendations as to the particulars which should be included in a hearing in a professorial discharge case. Bearing in mind Chief Justice
Warren's statement that "due process embodies the differing rules of fair play,
which through the years, have become associated with differing types of proceedings,"
the considered judgment of these two organizations, representing as they do both
professors and administrative heads, could very properly be resorted to by the courts
for guidance.
X
TENURE AND NoN-TENURE STATUS

Another matter now to be noted is the question raised by the state court decisions
in the Globe and Nostrand cases. The California statute and civil service regulations involved in the Globe case provided that a hearing prior to discharge should
be afforded only to permanent, and not to probationary, employees. Since Globe was
a temporary employee, he was not given a hearing. The trial court held that due
process required a hearing, even though state law did not, but the appellate court
reversed. To support his contention, Globe had relied on the Slochower case, but
the appellate court thought the case was authority for just the contrary position. It
noted that Slochower was "a permanent employee entitled to tenure under the state
law" and that "A New York statute gave a procedural right to a hearing before
discharge to persons in the class of Slochower." The court said that an analysis
of the opinion disclosed that the Supreme Court had determined Slochower's
"rights of employment and discharge under conditions of tenure, or permanency,
wherein by statute the employee was entitled to a hearing as compared with the
temporary status of petitioner herein and his total lack of any right of hearing under
the charter and civil service rules."' 02 As a temporary employee, Globe had no
vested employment right and could be discharged summarily. Under this interpretation, the due process violation in Slochower was the failure to accord a hearing
to a professor with tenure and statutory right to a hearing. As we have seen, when
101 44 A.A.U.P. BULL. 270 (1958).
,
10 Globe v. County of Los Angeles, 329 P.2d 971 976 (Cal. App. z958).
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the Globe case went to the Supreme Court, the argument was based solely on substantive grounds, and the question of Globe's right to a hearing was not passed upon.
When the Nostrand case was remanded for determination of the hearing question, the Washington Supreme Court reached the same conclusion. It first asserted
03
generally that'
in the absence of civil service or other tenure rights, public employees may be discharged
by their employers without any reason being assigned therefor. There is no vested right
to public employment in the state of Washington unless the employee has some tenure
rights provided by law. Since the power to discharge is absolute except for such tenure
rights, the discharged public employee is not entitled to a hearing regarding the reason
for his discharge.
Then, referring specifically to the oath requirement, the court stated:104
If he declines to sign, the employee is subject to immediate discharge. If he has no tenure
rights, he has no vested right to public employment, and the act affords him due process.
Nelson v. County of Los Angeles . . . . On the other hand, if he has tenure rights,
he must be accorded such a hearing as his contract of employment calls for.

The court then noted that the two plaintiffs were professors with tenure, and concluded that the oath statute, as to them, must be construed in light of the tenure
rights they had under the rules and regulations of the university regents. Under
those rules and regulations, professors with tenure were entitled to a hearing prior
to discharge. Thus, although the plaintiffs were not entitled to a hearing under
the oath statute, they were entitled to it under the tenure regulations which, the
court said, formed part of their contract of employment. It is clear that, under this
opinion, professors without tenure, or other state employees with no comparable
source of a hearing right, could be summarily discharged pursuant to the oath
statute. As we have seen, the Supreme Court dismissed a second appeal in Nostrand
"for want of a substantial federal question." From the Supreme Court's vantage
point, the Washington court had held that the plaintiffs in the case did have a right
to a hearing, for whatever reason under state law, and therefore, the due process
requirement of the Constitution was satisfied. The Supreme Court's dismissal of
the appeal, of course, did not indicate any agreement with the opinion of the Washington Supreme Court.
It is submitted that both the California and Washington courts were wrong.
First, each court misconstrued a Supreme Court opinion on which it placed reliance.
The California court's interpretation of Slochower as being based on his tenure
status and statutory right to a hearing is not supported by any language in the
Supreme Court's opinion, which does not indicate that these facts had any bearing
whatever upon the result. Indeed, Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in
Globe, commented on the California court's use of Slochower, and stated that "this
Court did not reverse the judgment of New York's highest court because it had'
...Nostrand v. Little, 36r P.2d 55r, 558 (Wash. x96x).
-7 d. at 560.
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disrespected Slochower's state tenure rights, but because it had sanctioned admin01 5
istrative action taken expressly on an unconstitutionally arbitrary basis."' Similarly,
the Washington court's reliance on the court's decision in Globe to support its state-

ment that a non-tenure employee could be summarily discharged is misplaced, since,
as we have noted twice, the question of Globe's right to a hearing was not raised
before the Supreme Court and was not discussed in the majority opinion.
A second and more fundamental fallacy in both opinions is that the two state
courts still cling to the idea that public employees never have any right to a hearing
prior to discharge unless it is given to them by statute or by contract. This completely ignores the fact that a right to a hearing may be required by due process
even when not otherwise provided for or authorized by law. Indeed, this is the
most important function of procedural due process, to require a hearing where
otherwise there would be none. It is a primary source of the right to a hearing,
and where the Supreme Court has recognized that due process gives an employee a
right to a hearing, the state court may not finesse away the right on the basis of
the employee's tenure or non-tenure status. This is no doubt what Justice Brennan
had in mind when he stated in Globe that "this Court has nothing to do with the
civil service systems of the States, as such."' 0' The sound and correct conclusion
would seem to be that where the right to a hearing prior to discharge is a requirement
of due process, it is a right which is shared by temporary as well as permanent
employees, and by professors who have not acquired tenure at their institutions as
well as those who have. If this were not so, we would have the anomalous situation
of a professor at one state university with a tenure system enjoying a constitutional
right not shared by his colleague at a less enlightened institution. This would
destroy the uniformity of obligation which the fourteenth amendment due process
clause imposes upon the states in their capacity as employers. In this connection, it
may be noted that Sweezy's right to academic freedom was recognized by the
Supreme Court, even though he was not a professor with tenure.

IXI
ONE-YEAR CONTRACTS

A serious problem in protecting academic freedom arises from the fact that many
institutions employ their teachers on a one-year contract basis. The contract is
renewed annually if the teacher is acceptable. All of the previous discussion has
concerned the substantive limitations on the right to discharge during a term or
the necessity of hearing before discharge. Now suppose the institution, for reasons
which would not support discharge, simply lets the contract run out and then declines to renew. Contract law provides no remedy for this situation, but it does
not therefore follow that constitutional law can not. However, the language of
5
Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. x, 16 (ig6o).
o"Id. at r5.
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the Supreme Court in Shelton v. Tucker.. lends no encouragement. There, in
considering the Arkansas organizational affidavit statute, the Court said that "These
provisions must be considered against the existing system of teacher employment
required by Arkansas law. Teachers there are hired on a year-to-year basis. They
are not covered by a civil service system, and they have no job security beyond the
end of each school year."108 The Court said it was not disputed that "to compel
a teacher to disclose his every associational tie is to impair that teacher's right of
free association, a right closely allied to freedom of speech, and a right which, like
free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society." The Court then stated:109
Such interference with personal freedom is conspicuously accented when the teacher
serves at the absolute will of those to whom the disclosure must be made-those who any
year can terminate the teacher's employment without bringing charges, without notice,

without a hearing, without affording an opportunity to explain.
This language at first blush seems to recognize an absolute right not to renew the
annual contract.

Another approach is suggested by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Zimmerman v. Board of Education of Newark. n ° Under New Jersey law, teachers are
employed on annual contracts. The first three years are probationary, and after
the third year the teacher acquires tenure status. The plaintiff's contract was not
renewed at the end of the third year and he brought suit seeking reinstatement
with tenure. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied the claim, stating:
At the expiration of an annual contract period, the employment relationship ceases to exist
unless a new contract has been entered into. While some states provide for automatic
re-employment or renewal of contract unless contrary notice is given, our statute does not
so specify. And except to the extent of constitutional or statutory limitations, there is no
legal duty on the part of a board to re-employ a teacher at the end of a contract term.111
The qualifying phrase clearly suggests that there are constitutional limitations even
to the right not to renew an expired contract. This suggestion was elaborated in a
concurring opinion by Chief Justice Weintraub:1"'
As a general proposition, powers vested in local government must be exercised reasonably and the judiciary will review local action for arbitrariness.... The question is whether
probationary employees are beyond that proposition.
The Legislature intended wide latitude in the employing authority to determine fitness
for permanent employment. It is clear that public employment may not be refused upon
a basis which would violate any express statutory or constitutional policy. A simple example
would be discrimination for race or religion. But I am not sure such specific limitations
are the only restraints. If the employing agency, for an absurd example, thought blondes
107364 U.S. 479 (I96O).
' Id. at 482.
'0'Id. at 486.
11038 N.J. 65, x83 A.2d 25 (r962).
I" Id. at 75, 183 A.2d at 30.
112
id. at 79-80, 183 A.2d at 33.
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were intrinsically too frivolous for permanent employment, a court would find it difficult
to withhold its hand.
But if we may inquire into "unreasonableness," it would seem to follow that there
must be a "reason," i.e., "cause" for refusal to continue the teacher into a tenure status. That
course has its difficulties. It would not mean the court would not recognize a wide range
of "reasons" or would lightly disagree with the employer's finding that the "reason" in
fact existed. But it would follow that upon demand the teacher would be entitled to a

statement of the grounds, with the right to a hearing and to a review as to whether the
grounds are arbitrary in nature or devoid of factual support. .

.

. Such individual in-

quiries could involve some practical problems in the administration of a school system.
Even this dictum was somewhat diluted. The teacher had been refused renewal
of his contract for having pleaded the fifth amendment before a subcommittee of the
House Un-American Activities Committee. In an earlier decision, the New Jersey
Supreme Court had voided discharges of teachers for this reason, holding that the
assertion of a federal constitutional right did not constitute "cause" for the dismissal
of a teacher with tenure. Chief Justice Weintraub, however, thought that refusal to
renew an annual contract for the same reason was not "arbitrary" under his quoted
theory. He believed that the discretionary power not to renew a contract, although
not absolute, was not as constitutionally restricted as the power to discharge during
the contract term.
The approach of the New Jersey court is in line with the Supreme Court's
language in Wieman v. Updegraff, that Congress could not provide that "no
Republican, Jew or Negro shall be appointed to public office, or that no federal
employee shall attend Mass or take any part in missionary work." Surely the power
of renewal would be subject to the same limitations as the power of original appointment. The absence of a contract in both cases is irrelevant, since the limitation is
not one imposed by contract, but by constitutional law. And surely a standard improper enough to invalidate a statute would likewise be prohibited in application
to an individual case by any form of state action. The real difficulty with respect
to one-year contracts is not, therefore, in establishing that the power not to renew
is, as a matter of law, subject to constitutional limitations." 3 The real difficulty is
the practical one that the invalid reason for the refusal to renew is not apt to be
formally announced. The proper answer here would seem to be the one suggested
by Chief Justice Weintraub-that is, to require a statement of the ground for
discharge upon demand by the teacher, followed by a hearing and judicial review
to determine if the reason for the refusal was valid or not. This would protect the
right of the teacher without interfering with any proper exercise of power by the
118 Another possible approach would be to analogize the renewal of teachers' contracts to the renewal
of a license issued by the state for a term permitting the licensee to engage in a certain occupation or
activity. It is the general rule in this situation that licenses can neither be revoked during a term nor
denied renewal on expiration of a term for arbitrary reasons or without notice and hearing. No reason
is apparent why the teacher should be accorded any less protection than a licensee. The courts have been
especially zealous in protecting the licenses of physicians and attorneys from arbitrary and summary
termination of their licenses. The teacher is equally a professional person, performing a function many
would consider even more important to society, but certainly at least equally so.
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appointing authority. The Supreme Court's language in Shelton cannot be taken
as a considered judgment that the power not to renew an annual contract is unrestricted. It seems more likely that the language was used for the purpose of highlighting the effect that the affidavit would have on academic freedom. Teachers
under one-year contracts would certainly be intimidated in their associations and in
their utterances for fear of alienating their employers.
CONCLUSION

Academic freedom has been considered in this article in its historic sense, as a
freedom of the teacher. The struggle for academic freedom has demonstrated that
academic tenure and due process are the means essential to achieving that great end.

In this struggle constitutional law can become an important support in public institutions, through the requirement of a hearing prior to a teacher's discharge and by
prohibiting certain reasons for discharge. Tenure thus becomes to some extent
constitutionally protected. As between the two forms of assistance constitutional
law can give to academic freedom, the procedural is probably more important than

the substantive. For surely the summary discharge is the most drastic and effective
technique in stifling academic freedom. It is safe to say that many discharges would
never have occurred if a hearing had been required and the reasons brought into
the open. Constitutional protection of due process in teacher termination cases needs
no more than the willingness of courts to require in the academic community what
they have required in a host of other contexts-the elemental decency and justice of
a right to notice and hearing before action is taken. There is no reason why the
most venerable of our constitutional rights should be wanting in public institutions
of learning. With or without a hearing, however, experience demonstrates that
teachers continue to be discharged for their beliefs, associations, teaching, speaking
and writing. Constitutional law can proscribe such reasons, and confine the bases
of discharge to those which are relevant to the teacher's fitness and competence.
But constitutional law can never be more than an occasional valuable ally in the
struggle for academic freedom. For various practical and legal reasons, judicial
intervention cannot reasonably be hoped for except in the extreme case of termination of employment. And yet there are many techniques of harrassment short of
termination which may be used to penalize a teacher-refusal to promote or to
increase salary are two of the most common. To combat and redress all the myriad
ways in which academic freedom may be undermined and thwarted will always
require vigilant and determined self-help activity within the academic community
itself. For this the law will never be a substitute. In addition, many cases in which
constitutional law might help will never be brought for various personal reasons.
Litigation is an expensive and lengthy ordeal which the aggrieved professor may be
unwilling to undergo. Or he may be so thoroughly disgusted with the institution
that he no longer has any desire to stay and "fight it out" and simply wants to go
elsewhere. Finally, even in a termination case the constitutional issue would need
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to be relatively dear and uncomplicated. Certainly not all discharges are for constitutionally prohibited reasons. A reading of the investigation reports of the fourteen

institutions now on the censured list of the AAUP illustrates the point. Some of
the cases were in the area of refusal to answer questions relating to former com-

munist membership. Some are a tangled skein of personality differences, conflicts
over educational policy, and the like. In others a semblance of a hearing was held. In

the judgment of the AAUP, academic freedom, tenure, or due process was violated
in each case, but many are not, for one reason or another, constitutional law cases.
In my opinion, the investigation reports do reveal, however, that in five of the

cases involving public institutions-Auburn University, 114 Texas Technological Col117

6
lege," Alabama State College," Alcorn Agricultural and Mechanical College,
and Sam Houston State Teachers College"--there was a clear violation of a constitutional right to a hearing. The termination was summary in all five cases under
circumstances where the reason for the discharge was dearly or allegedly unconstitu-

tional. In four cases involving public institutions-Auburn, Alabama State, Sam
Houston State Teachers College, and University of Illinois"--the substantive reason
for the discharge was in my opinion, clearly unconstitutional. In the Auburn case

the announced reason for the summary discharge was that the professor had written
a letter to the university newspaper supporting racial integration. In the Alabama
State case, the discharge was forced by former Governor Patterson because of the
professor's beliefs, associations and activities in behalf of racial equality. The years
since Brown v. Board of Education have seen an increasing number of abridgments

of academic freedom in the South over the racial issue' 2 0
The organized academic community has not in the past taken an active part in

urging issues of academic freedom upon the courts. The philosophy behind this
reluctance cannot be dismissed lightly.
214

2

But events are likely to force a change in

44 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 158 (1958)-

...Id. at 170.
116 47 id. 303 (1961).
117 48 id. 248 (1962).

118 49 id.44 (1963).
...Id. at 25.
10

See Woodward, The Unreported Crises in the Southern Colleges, Harper's Magazine, Oct. 1962,

p. 82.
Also on the AAUP censure list is Benedict College, a Negro Baptist institution in Columbia, South
Carolina. See 46 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 87 (2960). In this case Governor Timmerman and the State Board
of Education coerced the college administration" into discharging certain professors because of their views
and activities in behalf of racial integration, by threat of refusing to certify the college's graduates for
teaching positions in the public schools of the state. This would seem to be one of those rare instances
where "state action" has violated academic freedom, tenure and due process in a private institution.
...Ithas been stated that the AAUP neither "aggressively seeks, or is entirely sure that it even wants,
to have the principles it promotes incorporated into American constitutional law by the Supreme Court.
After all, what the Court gives, it can take away. Moreover, in the process it may unwittingly persuade
many people that only those principles of academic freedom that are finally recognized by the courts as
law need be observed. . . . academic freedom may be left in a weaker position than it was before it
became a concern of the law." Carr, Academic Freedom, the American Association of University Prolessors, and the United States Supreme Court, 45 A.A.U.P. BULL. 5, 6, 20 (1959).
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policy. The cases will continue to be brought by embattled professors and teachers,

perhaps in increasing numbers now that the Supreme Court has at last given express
recognition to academic freedom in its opinions. The need to see that academic
freedom issues are properly presented so that they may be properly passed upon is
likely to impel more and more intervention by professional organizations if only
on an amicus basis. The courts, in the long run, neither can nor should be ignored
by the academic community. Although their assistance is not likely to be forthcoming in any but extreme cases, an enlightened judicial attitude would inevitably
have a wholesome effect, in the academic world and in society generally, in enhancing
the acceptance of and respect for academic freedom. 22
As yet, the Supreme Court's decisions are harbingers of what is to come, a
promise of protection yet to be redeemed. What is needed now is a decision from

the Court squarely invalidating the termination of a teacher's employment made
without a hearing or because of a violation of academic freedom. Until there is
such a decision, it is probably more accurate to refer to academic freedom as an
emerging constitutional right. A case involving a teacher whose employment was
terminated for upholding the Court's own decision in Brown would be a fitting
vehicle to put the expressly recognized freedom on a sound footing. But whether
in the racial area or not, such a decision seems to be, in the fullness of time, inevitable.
"' ,. . . [C]ourts are powerful agencies of social control, and even their inactivity may entail serious
consequences. They have much to offer in the defense of intellectual freedom. When American courts
come to understand that the right of teachers and students to academic freedom is a fundamental legal
right which is as much entitled to judicial protection as any other constitutional right, then indeed, will
the cause of intellectual liberty acquire a powerful and most welcome ally." Fellman, Academic Freedom
in American Law, 5965 Wis. L. REV. 3, 46.

